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CHAPTER 9 
Labor Law 
WILLIAM T. SHERRY, JR." and DAVID E. WATSON° 0 
§9.1. Unlawful Strikes: Civil Contempt. Section 9A (a) of Chapter 
150E provides: "No public employee or employee organization shall 
engage in a strike, and no public employee or employee organization 
shall induce, encourage or condone any strike, work stoppage, slowdown 
or withholding of services by such public employees." 1 Section 9A(b) 
requires an employer to petition the Labor Relations Commission for 
an investigation whenever a strike occurs or is about to occur. If after 
an investigation the Commission determines that a violation of section 
9A( a) has occurred or is about to occur, "it shall immediately set re-
quirements that must be complied with, including, but not limited to, 
instituting appropriate proceedings in the superior court . . . ." 2 
Section 9A represents an expansion of the prohibition against strikes 
contained in the predecessor statutes. The scope of the prohibition in 
earlier statutes ran only against public employees,3 whereas the prohibi-
tion in section 9A also runs against employee organizations.4 During 
the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Labor Relations Com-
mission v. Boston Teachers Union," considered the power of the courts 
to hold a labor organization and its representatives in civil contempt of 
court orders relating to conduct violative of section 9A (a). 
The inability of the Boston School Committee and the Boston Teach-
ers Union to agree on the terms of a collective bargaining contract to 
cover the 1975-76 school term caused the union membership to vote on 
September 2, 1975, to authorize a strike against the City school system. 
" WILLIAM T. SHERRY, JR. is a senior partner in the firm of Nutter, 
McClennen & Fish, Boston, and is the author of §§ 9.1-9.3. 
00 DAVID E. WATSON is an associate in the firm of Nutter, McCiennen & 
Fish, Boston, and is the author of §§ 9.4-9.7. 
§9.1. 1 The term "strike" is very broadly defined in the statutes, and includes 
"a public employee's refusal, in concerted action with others, to report for 
duty .... " G.L. c. 150E, §1. 
2 See id. § 9A(b). 
3 See former G.L. c. 149, §§ 178F(10) and 178.M. 
4 See G.L. c. 150E, § 9A(a). 
5 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2738, 371 N.E.2d 761. 
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The strike \Vas to begin on September 22, 1975, unless the Committee 
made an acceptable offer prior to that time. 6 At the same meeting 
the membership also authorized the union's executive board to draw up 
a sanction sheet that would enumerate measures to be taken against 
union members who failed to follow the strike' decision. 7 As a result 
of that vote, the School Committee filed a petition on September 12 
with the Labor Relations Commission for a section 9A (b) strike inves-
tigation.H The Commission conducted an investigation and, on Septem-
ber 17, issued an interim order.n The order contained findings that a 
sh·ike was threatened and that union representatives had "encouraged 
and condoned" such action.10 The union was ordered, inter alia, to 
"cease and desist from encouraging or condoning the threatened 
strike." 11 On September 18, the union distributed the sanction sheet 
authorized at the September 2 meeting.12 That same day the Com-
mission filed a complaint in superior court alleging that neither the 
School Committee nor the union was complying with its order.13 A 
judge of the superior court issued preliminary injunctions enforcing the 
Commission's order.H On September 19, another superior court judge 
amended the injunction to incorporate as much of the Commission's 
earlier order as sought to enjoin the union from "encouraging or con-
doning the threatened strike." 1" Also on September 19, the Commission 
went to eourt with a motion to amend its complaint to include, as 
individuals and as class representatives of other officers, agents and 
members of the union, specially named officers of the union, and mem-
bers of its executive board.16 The court granted the motion to amendP 
A temporary restraining order sought by the Commission was granted 
at this time. The order provided in pertinent part that the defendants 
were restrained from: 
(a) striking, engaging in a work stoppage, or work slowdown or 
any other conduct proscribed by G.L. c. 150E § 9A(a); (b) in-
stigating, authorizing, ratifying or threatening any of the above 





11 Id. at 2740, 371 N.E.2d at 764. 
12 Id., 371 N.E.2d at 764-65. 
13 I d., 371 N .E.2d at 765. The opinion does not give any indication of how 
the School Committee was not in compliance with the Commission's September 17 
order. In any event, that fact had no relevance to the case. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 2740-41, 371 N.E.2d at 765. 
17 Id. 
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acts; (c) making any future threats or taking any action with respect 
to past threats, in connection with, or otherwise imposing any sanc-
tions or punishments against Union members and Employees repre-
sented by the Union who cross a Union picket line or who fail or 
refuse to strike, to engage in a work stoppage or work slowdown 
or other conduct proscribed by ,G.L. c. 150E § 9A (a) .18 
On September 21, the union membership held a meeting, which was 
chaired by Henry G. Robinson.19 Robinson, the union's president, was 
one of the persons specifically named in the court order.20 The mem-
bership approved the union negotiating team's unanimous recommenda-
tion to reject the School Committee's latest offer.21 The motion to 
approve the team's recommendation was advanced by Joan Buckley, the 
union's executive vice president and another person specifically named 
in the court order.22 No separate vote was taken on the strike issue and 
no officer or board member took any action to inform the meeting about 
the consequences that would flow from effectuating the September 2 
strike resolution.23 There being no acceptable offer of the School Com-
mittee, a strike commenced on September 22, with picket lines estab-
lished at Boston schools.24 
On petition of the Labor Relations Commission, 25 civil contempt pro-
ceedings were instituted against the union and five named individuals, 
including Robinson and Buckley.26 The court found the defendants to 
be in civil contempt of court and assessed fines against them.27 The 
defendants appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the 
case on its own motion.28 The Court affirmed the lower court's findings 
of contempt relative to the strike, but reversed those findings based on 
the distribution of the sanction sheet.29 







25 I d. The petition alleged that (a) the union membership had adopted Robin-
son's recommendation to reject the proposal; (b) the union was engaged in a 
strike proscribed by c. 150E, § 9A (a); (c) the named individual defendants 
authorized and ratified the strike; (d) as a result of this action, picket lines had 
been established at several schools and the delivery of education had been im-
paired; (e) the defendants' conduct constituted "a willful and undoubtful dis-
obedience of this Court's clear and unequivocal commands, contained in its 
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order." Id. at 2742, 371 
N.E.2d at 765-66. 
26 Id. at 2742, 371 N.E.2d at 766. 
27 Id. at 2738, 2742-46, 371 N.E.2d at 764, 766-67. 
28 Id. at 2738, 371 N.E.2d at 764. 
29 Id. at 2738-39, 371 N.E.2d at 764. 
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The defendants' objections to the findings of contempt were several. 
As to the merits of the contempt order, they argued that the conduct 
forming the basis of the contempt proceedings-failure to take action 
to prevent the union from striking-could not, as a matter of law, be 
considered a clear and undoubted disobedience of a clear and unequiv-
ocal command of a court. They also argued that the Commission's 
contempt petition had failed to provide them with adequate notice as 
to what acts allegedly constituted contempt.30 With regard to the fines 
imposed, the defendants argued, inter alia, that the provisions of chapter 
150E, section 15,:n provided the exclusive remedy, and that fines can-
not be assessed against a union qua union, due to its status as an un-
incorporated association. 32 
First addressing the defendant's claim as to the inadequate notice, the 
Court concluded that all contempt adjudications concerning the dis-
bibution of the sanction sheet had to be reversed.33 It explained: 
It is clear beyond any doubt, that requirements of due process, as 
well as fundamental fairness, require that one must be given notice 
of charges prior to a hearing on civil contempt whenever the alleged 
contemptuous conduct occurred outside the presence of the court . 
. . . Not only must the charges per se be set forth with adequate 
specificity, but there must be a description of the specific acts 
which underlie the charges. [citations omitted] .34 
The Court concluded that because there was no specific reference to 
the sanction sheet in the Commission's contempt petition, the defend-
ants were not adequately appraised of this allegation prior to the be-
ginning of the hearing.35 The Court did find, however, that the allega-
tion of the petition stating that the defendants authorized and ratified 
the strike was sufficient notice to apprise the defendants of the charges 
prior to the contempt hearing. 36 "The ultimate act, the strike, for which 
their conduct was called into question, was specifically set forth." 37 
30 Id. at 2746, 371 N.E.2d at 767. 
31 G.L. c. 150E, § 15 provides in relevant part: 
No compensation shall be paid by an employer to an employee with respect 
to any day or part thereof when such employee is engaged in a strike against 
said employer, nor shall such employee be eligible to recover such com-
pensation at a later date in the event that such employee is required to work 
additional days to fulfill the provisions of collective bargaining agreement. 
Any employee who engaged in a strike shall be subject to discipline and 
discharge proceedings by the employer. 
32 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2752, 371 N.E.2d at 769. 
33 Id. at 2746, 371 N.E.2d at 767. 
3• Id. at 2746-47, 371 N.E.2d at 767. 
so Id., 371 N.E.2d at 767-68. See Sodones v. Sodones, 366 Mass. 121, 128-29, 
314 N.E.2d 906, 911-12 (1974). 
36 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2747-48, 371 N.E.2d at 768. 
37 Id. at 2748, 371 N.E.2d at 768. 
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Having concluded that the notice concerning the strike was sufficient, 
the Court then considered whether "there was the unquestioned dis-
obedience to clear and unequivocal commands of the court." 38 The 
major thrust of the defendants' argument with respect to this issue was 
that the trial judge had, as the Supreme Judicial Court so found, predi-
cated his contempt orders concerning Robinson and Buckley on the 
view that they were under an obligation to take affirmative action to 
inform the union membership of the outstanding orders of the Court.39 
The defendants argued that such an obligation was not made explicit 
in the order, and that legal liability could not attach for failure to com-
ply with implicit requirements.40 The Comt, while noting that it was 
a close question,41 disagreed with the defendants, and found an explicit 
obligation to act affinnatively. The Court stated: 
The defendants were also prohibited, however, from condoning or 
ratifying such actions. We believe that the plain meaning of these 
latter terms was intended to put, and should have put, the defend-
ants on notice that not only would certain positive acts be the basis 
of contempt citations, but that the failure to act in appropriate sit-
uations would render them similarly liable.42 
The Court approved the course taken by the superior court in including 
these terms in the restraining order, since the policy of section 9A could 
also be impaired under certain circumstances by inaction of a union 
leader. The Court observed that it was appropriate to impose these 
duties on the individual defendants because, "as officers of the union 
they were a natural conduit for communication to the union rank and 
file." 4 ~ The Court finally stated: "vVe cannot conclude on these facts 
that the clearly expressed and presumably understood goals of the Leg-
islature, the commission, and the court could be frustrated by such an 
ostrich-like attitude on the part of the responsible leaders." 44 
Having found no lack of due process in the contempt orders, the 
Court then turned to the defendants' objections regarding the fines.45 
With respect to the defendants' argument that the remedies set forth in 
chapter 150E, section 15, are exclusive, the Court initially noted that the 
38 Id. See Nickerson v. Dowd, 342 Mass. 462,464, 174 N.E.2d 346, 347 (1961), 
where the Court held that for civil contempt "there must be a clear and unequivocal 
command and an equally clear and undoubted disobedience." 
39 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2748, 371 N.E.2d at 768. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 2749, 371 N.E.2d at 768. 
43 Id. at 2749-50, 371 N.E.2d at 768-69, citing Oil Workers Internat'l Union v. 
Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 557, 230 P.2d 71, 98 ( 1951 ). 
H 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2751, 371 N.E.2d at 769. 
45 Id. at 2752, 371 N.E.2d at 769. 
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purpose of that section was to limit the penalties which may be exacted 
by employers against public employees participating in a strike.46 The 
Court went on to find that such penalties were not intended to limit the 
power of the courts to use contempt findings to achieve compliance 
with lawfully issued judicial orders.47 
The defendants' argument that the union qua union cannot be fined 
because of its status as an unincorporated association 48 was based 
primarily on McCoTmack v. Labor Relations Commission.49 In Mc-
Cormack, the Court held that since the law knew no such entity as an 
unincorporated association, such an association could not be made a 
party defendant.50 In the present case, the Court, without overruling 
McCoTmack," 1 concluded that the fine against the union should be af-
firmed: 
When c. 150E, § I et seq., was enacted in 1973, it represented a 
comprehensive revision of the statutory schemes which previously 
regulated the organizational and collective bargaining rights of pub-
lic employees .... 'Vhile there are great similarities in both opera-
tion aml language between c. I50E and the predecessor statutes, 
G.L. c. 149, §§ 178F-178N, there are also crucial differences. More-
over, the meaning, scope, and effect of the sections must be as-
certained in light of the expanded legislative purpose evident in the 
enactment of c. 150E. 
The most crucial difference for purposes of this case lies in the 
expanded scope of the prohibition against strikes contained in .c. 
150E, § 9A (a), as compared to the predecessor statutes, G.L. c. 149, 
§ 178F(IO), and G.L. c. 149, § 178M. [citations omitted]. 
Since the Legislature was cognizant of our preexisting rules rela-
tive to unincorporated associations, ... it presumably meant to 
override those rules if necessary to allow the commission and the 
courts to implement the strike .prohibition. [citation omitted] .52 
The Court thus concluded that, despite the fact that the union was an 
unincorporated association, fines were properly assessed against it in the 
contempt proceeding. 
46 Id. at 2753, 371 N.E.2d at 770. See note 31 supra for relevant portions of 
the text of section 15. 
47 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2753, 371 N.E.2d at 770. 
48 Id. 
49 358 Mass. 682, 266 N.E.2d 651 (1971). 
oo I d. at 684-85, 266 N .E.2d at 652-53. 
51 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2755-56, 371 N.E.2d at 771. 
52 Id. at 2754-55, 2757, 371 N.E.2d at 770-71, 771. See Sherry, Labor Law, 
1974 ANN. SuRv. MASs. LAw § 2.12, at 24-31. 
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The most potent weapon that labor organizations have to obtain con-
cessions from employers during negotiations is the threat of strike. Ac-
cordingly, the prohibition against strikes contained in section 9A plays 
a critical role in negotiations between public employers and the per-
sons they employ. This decision of the Supreme Judicial Court makes 
it clear that the Labor Relations Commission and the courts are invested 
with substantial power to enforce the strike prohibition of chapter 150E. 
The Court's holding that a labor organization can be made a party 
defendant to strike prohibition proceedings even though it is an unin-
corporated association enhances the enforcement power of the courts. 
But perhaps the most important aspect of Boston Teachers Union is the 
Court's holding that the union officers not only were prohibited from 
engaging in specific acts which would result in a strike, but also that 
they were under an affirmative duty from which failure to act in cer-
tain situations could result in a finding of contempt. In particular, the 
Court's finding that Buckley and Robinson had the responsibility not 
to "condone or ratify" actions that could lead to a strike gives a court 
in such situations great latitude in issuing and enforcing its orders. 
§9.2. Scope of Managerial Exclusion From G.L. c. 150E. Chapter 
150E of the General Laws gives collective bargaining rights to most 
employees of the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions.1 How-
ever, certain categories of employees are specifically excluded from the 
coverage of that statute, including "managerial employees." 2 In School 
§9.2. 1 See G.L. c. 150E, §§ 1-15. 
2 C.L. c. 150E, § 1 reads in relevant part: 
The following words and phrases as used in this chapter shall have the 
following meaning unless the context clearly requires otherwise:-
"Employee" or "public employee", any person employed by a public em-
ployer except elected officials, appointed officials, members of any board or 
commission, representatives of any public employer, including the heads, di-
rectors and executive and administrative officers of departments and agencies 
of any public employer, and other managerial employees or confidential em-
ployees, and members of the militia or national guard and employees of the 
commission, and officers and employees within the departments of the state 
secretary, state treasurer, state auditor and attorney general. Employees shall 
be designated as managerial employees only if they (a) participate to a sub-
stantial degree in formulating or determining policy, or (b) assist to a sub-
stantial degree in the preparation for or the conduct of collective bargaining 
on behalf of a public employer, or (c) have a substantial responsibility involv-
ing the exercise of independent ;udgment of an appellate responsibility not 
initially in effect in the administration of a collective bargaining agreement or 
in personnel administration. Employees shall be designated as confidential 
employees only if they directly assist and act in a confidential capacity to a 
person or persons otherwise excluded from coverage under this chapter. [em-
phasis added]. 
Chapter 150E was inserted in large part by Acts of 1973, c. 1078 and took 
effect on July 1, 1974, repealing G.L. c. 149, §§ 1780, F-N. See generally Sherry, 
Labor Law, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw § 2.12, at 24-31. 
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Committee of Wellesley v. Labor Relations Commission,3 the Supreme 
Judicial Court, in a case of first impression, considered the parameters 
of the managerial exclusion. 
The Wellesley School Committee for a number of years had recog-
nized the Wellesley Teachers Association as the collective bargaining 
representative of a unit of school administrators ("unit B employees") 
that included principals, assistant principals, directors, coordinators, and 
department heads.4 After chapter 150E went into effect 5 the School 
Committee refused to continue its recognition of the Teachers Associa-
tion, claiming that the administrators were "managerial employees," as 
defined in the statutory exclusion, and thus no longer had any statutory 
bargaining rights.6 The School Committee then petitioned the Labor 
Relations Commission to have the unit B employees designated as man-
agerial employees.7 Meanwhile, the Teachers Association filed a com-
plaint of prohibited practice with the Commission, alleging that the 
Committee had violated its duty under chapter 150E, sections 10( a) { 1) 
and ( 5), by its refusal to bargain in good faith. 8 The Commission deter-
mined that none of the administrators were "managerial" under any of 
the statutory definitions and that the School Committee's refusal to bar-
gain with the Teachers Association therefore did violate chapter 150E, 
section 10( a) ( 1) and ( 5) .9 Accordingly, the Commission ordered the 
Committee to bargain collectively and in good faith with the association 
as the bargaining representative of the unit B employees.10 
The Labor Relations Commission brought an action to enforce its 
order in superior court which was consolidated with the School Com-
mittee's claim for judicial review of the order.n When the superior 
3 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2207, 379 N.E.2d 1077. 
4 Id. at 2207-08, 379 N.E.2d at 1077-08. This recognition of the unit B em-
ployees was in accordance with former G.L. c. 149, §§ 1780, F-N. 
5 See note 2 supra. 
6 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2208, 379 N.E.2d at 1078. 
7 Id. 
s Id. G.L. c. 150E, § 10 provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall be a prohibited 
practice for a public employer or its designated representative to: ( 1) interfere, 
restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of any right guaranteed under this 
chapter; . . . ( 5) Refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with the exclusive 
representative as required in section six. . . ." 
9 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2208-09, 379 N.E.2d at 1078. See Town of Wellesley 
School Committee, 1 M.L.C. 1389 (1975). For a detailed analysis of the Commis-
sion's decision, see Sherry, Labor Law, 1975 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw § 8.8, at 159-63. 
to 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2209, 379 N.E.2d at 1078. Before its final determina-
tion, the Commission had issued an interim order requiring the Committee to 
bargain with the association pending resolution of the consolidated cases, which 
the committee in fact did do. Thus the Commission, while holding that the Com-
mittee's refusal to bargain was unjustified, noted that the Committee had not acted 
in bad faith. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2209 & nn. 4 & 5, 379 N.E.2d at 1078 & nn. 
4 & 5. 
11 Id. at 2209-10, 379 N.E.2d at 1078. 
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court affirmed the Commission's order, the Committee appealed.12 The 
Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review 13 and affirmed 
the judgment of the superior court.14 
In its decision, the Supreme Judicial Court initially noted that while 
the duty of statutory interpretation belongs to the courts, an administra-
tive interpretation of a statute is accorded great deference.15 In view 
of the disjunctive wording of the managerial exclusion,16 the Court, in 
reviewing the Commission's interpretation of chapter 150E, section 1, 
proceeded to consider all three segments of the managerial exclusion. 
The Court ultimately concluded that the Commission had properly inter-
preted and applied the statute in its finding that the administrators were 
not within the section 1 managerial exclusion. 1 7 
The first issue was whether the administrators "participate to a sub-
stantial degree in formulating or interpreting policy." 18 The Court 
noted that the phrase "to a substantial degree" was a clear indication 
of the legislature's purpose of including in the term "managerial em-
ployee" only those with significant responsibility in the decisionmaking 
process. 1n The Court found, as did the Commission, that in order for 
pmticipation in policy formulation to be "substantial" the employee must 
have more than an advisory or consulting role, but does not necessarily 
have to have the authority to make final decisions.20 The Court also 
agreed with the Commission's determination that the policy decisions 
contemplated by the statute must be of "major importance" and "must 
impact a significant part of the public enterprise." 21 Applying these 
standards, the Court went on to conclude that the Commission's finding 
that the Wellesley administrators did not participate to a substantial 
degree in formulating or determining policy was supported by substantial 
evidence. 22 
The Court then turned to the second alternative for defining the em-
ployees as managerial: whether the employees "assist to a substantial 
degree in the preparation for or the conduct of collective bargaining on 
behalf of the public employer." 23 Although concluding that the ad-
12 Id. at 2210, 379 N.E.2d at 1078. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 2224, 379 N.E.2d at 1084. 
15 Id. at 2210-11, 379 N.E.2d at 1079. 
16 See note 2 supra. 
17 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2224, 379 N.E.2d at 1084. 
18 See note 2 supra. 
19 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2211, 379 N.E.2d at 1079. This phrase was added 
by Acts of 1974, c. 354 amending G.L. c. 150, § 1. 
20 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2214, 379 N.E.2d at 1080. 
21 Id. at 2211, 379 N.E.2d at 1079. 
22 Id. at 2211-17, 379 N.E.2d at 1079-81. 
23 See note 2 supra. 
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ministrators did not render substantial assistance in this area, 24 the 
Commission had found that one elementary school principal whose 
managerial status was in question had participated in the negotiation 
of the educational secretaries' contract to the extent of attending one 
meeting.25 Furthermore, it also had found that the administrators were 
occasionally asked their opinion on possible problem areas in the ad-
ministration of the teachers' and secretaries' collective bargaining agree-
ments.26 The School Committee did not contend that these limited in-
stances taken alone rose to the level of "substantial" assistance in the 
preparation for or the conduct of collective bargaining; rather, it argued 
that this participation, coupled with testimony by the superintendent 
of schools that he and the School Committee desired more administra-
tive participation and that two administrators had refused to participate 
in negotiations with the secretaries, did constitute "substantial" involve-
ment.27 The Court held, however, that the potential for a greater degree 
of future participation was an insufficient basis for a conclusion con-
cerning the present managerial status of any of the administrators.28 
The third issue was whether the employees "have a substantial re-
sponsibility involving the exercise of independent judgment of an ap-
pellate responsibility ... or in personnel administration." 29 The School 
Committee contended that the secondary school principals in unit B fell 
within this classification because of their second tier roles in the griev-
ance procedure for secondary teachers. 30 Looking at the only two 
grievances that had ever utilized these proceedings, the Commission 
had found that the principals had no authority to adjust the grievance 
and acted "merely as a conduit for the processing of the grievance." 31 
Accordingly, the Commission had determined that the actualities showed 
the principals' responsibilities in the grievance proceedings to be initial 
24 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2218, 379 N.E.2d at 1082. 
25 I d. at 2217, 379 N .E.2d at 1082. 
26 Id. at 2217-18, 379 N.E.2d at 1082. 
21 Id. at 2218-19, 379 N.E.2d at 1082. 
28 Id. at 2219, 379 N.E.2d at 1082. 
29 See note 2 supra. 
30 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2220, 379 N.E.2d at 1083. The agreement with the 
teachers called for a secondary teacher-initiated grievance to be filed with the 
employee's supervisor, i.e., the teacher's department head, director, or coordinator. 
If not resolved at this level, the grievance was to be referred to the secondary 
principal. The next levels of the grievance process involved the superintendent, 
school committee, and arbitration. 
In the elementary schools, all grievances were to be filed with the principal; if 
not resolved there, a grievance would be referred to the superintendent. See id. 
& n.l5, 379 N.E.2d at 1083 & n.l5. 
31 Id. at 2220-21, 379 N.E.2d at 1083. The language quoted is that of the 
Court. 
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and not appellate.32 The Committee argued that the Commission had 
erroneously considered only the actual grievance powers exercised by 
the secondary principals and not their potential powers. 33 The Court 
disagreed with the Committee, stating that the Commission had also 
considered the principals' potential powers and had correctly distin-
guished "not between actual and potential responsibilities but between 
actual and potential responsibilities on the one hand and speculative 
authority on the other." 34 Thus, the Court concluded that substantial 
evidence undergirded the Commission's findings that none of the unit 
B personnel were within the statutory definition of managerial employees 
under either the first, second, or third alternatives.35 
Because of the narrow interpretation given to the managerial exclu-
sion in chapter 150E, section 1, the effect of the Court's decision in 
Wellesley School Committee is that very few employees will be ex-
cluded from chapter 150E under a managerial classification. It is im-
portant to note, however, the strong argument which could have been 
made that certain of the unit B employees could be characterized as 
"confidential employees" under section 1, and thus would have no bar-
gaining rights.36 Unfortunately, while this issue was considered in 
detail in the Commission's decision,37 it was not addressed in the School 
Committee's brief and thus was deemed waived.38 
§9.3. Extent of Duty to Bargain in Good Faith. In Labor Relations 
Commission v. Board of Selectmen of Dracut,! the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered the obligations of municipal officials to sponsor and 
to support enactments necessary to implement the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement that predecessor officials had negotiated with the 
bargaining representatives of certain municipal employees. 
In December of 1971, the Board of Selectmen of Dracut voted to 
recognize the International Brotherhood of Police Officers as the exclu-
sive bargaining agent of its police officers.2 Negotiations between the 
union and the Town's three selectmen ensued.3 By February 1, 1972, 
the parties had agreed to the terms of a draft agreement which was 
32 Id. at 2221, 379 N.E.2d at 1083. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 2222, 379 N.E.2d at 1083-84. 
35 Id. at 2224, 379 N.E.2d at 1084. 
36 See note 2 supra. See also Sherry, Labor Law, 1975 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw 
§8.8, at 162-63. 
37 See Town of Wellesley School Committee, 1 M.L.C. 1389 at 1409. 
38 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2208 & n.2, 379 N.E.2d at 1078 & n.2. 
§9.3. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 657, 373 N.E.2d 1165. 
2 Id. at 658, 373 N.E.2d at 1167. 
aId. 
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initialed by all three selectmen and by the union.4 A week later, at 
a regular meeting of the Board, the bargaining agreement was formally 
executed by the union and by two of the three selectmen.5 The third 
selectman, Selectman Gallagher, refused to sign the agreement, although 
he had initialed the draft on February 1, ostensibly, as the Court found, 
"for the purpose of indicating his assent to its provisions." 6 Implemen-
tation of the contract required approval of appropriations and other 
action by the annual town meeting. 7 Under the final provisions of the 
agreement, the parties were bound to "sponsor and support" the con-
tract before the annual town meeting "as a fair and equitable con-
tract. ... " 8 The same day the final agreement was executed, the Board 
of Selectmen also signed the warrant for the annual town meeting.9 
Before this meeting was held, however, the composition of the Board 
of Selectmen had been altered by elections and an increase in the size 
of the Board from three to five members.10 Two of the three incumbent 
selectmen, Gallagher and Campbell, were among the members of the 
new five-member Board.11 Thus, only two members of the new Board 
had participated in the collective bargaining with the union, and only 
one of the five members actually had signed the final agreement. 
When the annual town meeting was held on March 11, 1972, the 
Town's finance committee re9ommended an appropriation that would 
meet the negotiated salary increase, but would be insufficient to fund 
the other economic benefits provided by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.12 Selectman Gallagher supported this recommended appropria-
tion, and no members of the Board recommended passage of a larger 
appropriation sufficient to fund all the provisions of the agreement.13 
The town meeting voted to adopt the finance committee's recommended 




7 Id. at 658-59, 373 N.E.2d at 1168. Appropriations were needed to fund sev-
eral increased financial benefits, an amendment to a by-law was needed to allow 
for the agreement's new work week of four days of duty and two off, and the 
town had to vote to accept G.L. c. 41, § 108L (a local option statute) to meet a 
provision of the agreement calling for educational incentive pay for the police 
officers of Dracut. Id. 
s 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 658, 373 N.E.2d at 1167-68. 
9 Id., 373 N.E.2d at 1168. 
1o Id. at 659, 373 N.E.2d at 1168. 
n Id. 
12 These economic benefits included a 5.5% salary increase, a clothing and equip-
ment allowance, longevity increases, holiday pay, greater compensation for court 
appearances, and the "four-two" work week. Id. at 659 n.2, 373 N.E.2d at 1168 
n.2. See note 7 supra. 
13 Id. at 659-60, 373 N.E.2d at 1168. 
14 Id. at 660, 373 N.E.2d at 1168. 
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On April 4, 1972, the union flied a complaint of prohibited practice 
with the Labor Relations Commission, alleging that the Town had re-
fused to bargain in good faith in violation of chapter 149, section 178L 
of the General Laws.15 After investigation and hearings, the Commis-
sion found that the Town had engaged in a prohibited practice through 
the Board of Selectmen's failure to place on the town warrant the 
articles necessary to implement the agreement and by the Board's failure 
to support passage of the appropriations necessary to fund the agree-
ment.16 The Commission ordered the Town to take the necessary steps 
to place the articles on the town warrant at the next meetingY When 
the Town failed to act, the Commission brought a petition for enforce-
ment in the superior court,l 8 An interlocutory decree was entered in 
effect ordering the Town to comply with the Commission's order.19 
The case was subsequently reserved and reported to the Supreme Judi-
cial Court. 20 
Because actions taken at subsequent town meetings had rendered the 
issue moot,21 the Court did not determine whether the interlocutory 
decree should be enforced. 22 It did consider, however, whether succes-
sor public officials might be required to endorse publicly the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by their predecessors.23 
The Court initially noted that since selectmen are publicly elected 
officials, their constituents are entitled to "the unfettered exercise of 
their judgment on matters of policy." 24 The Court went on to find 
that a decision of whether to support publicly a municipal collective 
bargaining contract constitutes such a policy decision.25 Accordingly, 
15 Id. Former G.L. c. 149, §§ 178D, F-N was the immediate predecessor statute 
to G.L. c. 150E. See Sherry, Labor Law, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw § 2.12, at 
24-31. 
16 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 660, 373 N.E.2d at 1168. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 660-61, 373 N.E.2d at 1168. 
2o Id. at 661, 373 N.E.2d at 1168-69. 
21 At three special town meetings, articles were approved which provided fund-
ing for all the terms of the agreement and gave the town's acceptance of G.L. c. 
41, § 108L (the educational incentive pay for police officers statute), but at the 
ensuing annual town meeting, approval of all these articles was rescinded. Id. at 
665-67, 373 N.E.2d at 1170-71. The Court determined that the vote of recission 
was effective: The legislature did not provide in G.L. c. 41, § 108L a means for 
revoking acceptance of the statute and its terms. Moreover, since rights had vested 
in the union through the votes of the three special town meetings, they could not 
be lost by rescinding votes at a later town meeting. Id. at 666-69, 373 N.E.2d at 
1171-72. 
22 Id. at 663, 373 N.E.2d at 1169. 
23 Id. at 663-64, 373 N.E.2d at 1170. 
24 Id. at 664, 373 N.E.2d at 1170. 
25 Id. 
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the Court held that "successor members of a board of selectmen should 
not be required to adopt a patticular position which might not be in 
accord with their own judgment on a public issue." 26 
The Court went on to distinguish the facts in Dracut from those in 
Mendes v. City of Taunton. 21 In Mendes, the Court held that a mayor 
was obliged to submit an appropriation request necessary to fund a 
collective bargaining agreement executed by his predecessor.28 The 
Dracut Court reasoned, however, that the action at issue in Mendes was 
"a ministerial one which involved no exercise of a policy making func-
tion." 2n Thus, the holding in Mendes does not extend to requiring suc-
cessor public officials to perform "discretionary, judgmental actions" 
such as those involved in the case at bar.30 The Court concluded: 
A decision not to support a collective bargaining agreement is a 
discretionary matter. The exercise of independent judgment con-
cerning such matters serves an important public purpose. We con-
clude that elected successor public officials cannot be required to 
endorse publicly the terms of a collective bargaining agreement 
negotiated by their predecessors. 31 
Thus the Court determined that the selectmen's conduct at the March 
11, 1972, town meeting was not in breach of the Board of Selectmen's 
obligation to bargain in good faith. 
The Court's decision in Dracut resolves some intriguing questions 
regarding the responsibilities of elected officials to implement the terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement. On public policy grounds the 
Court concluded that successor members of an elected municipal body 
are not obligated to support enactments needed to implement the terms 
of a bargaining agreement negotiated by their predecessors if the matter 
involves a question of policy. However, if a purely ministerial act is 
all that is required to implement the terms of the agreement, then the 
successor members are indeed bound by the actions of their predecessors. 
This discretionary I ministerial distinction is a familiar one in the law 
and thus provides a workable standard. Left open in the Dracut deci-
sion, however, is whether the same members of an elected municipal 
body can be compelled to give an agreement support if they have con-
26 Id. 
27 366 Mass. 109, 315 N.E.2d 865 (1974). 
28 Id. at 118-19, 315 N.E.2d at 872-73. 
29 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 665, 373 N.E.2d at 1170. 
so Id. 
31 Id. The Court specifically noted that its decision was based on public policy 
grounds, and that it was not reaching any first amendment issue raised by requiring 
elected officials to support a particular position. Id. n.7, 373 N.E.2d at 1170 n.7. 
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tracted to provide it.32 That issue was not involved in Dracut because 
only one of the five members of the new Board had so agreed,33 and 
it would have been futile to compel that single member to support the 
necessary measures when his suppo1t would probably have carried little 
weight before the town meeting. 
§9.4. Federal Preemption. The Smvey year presented the Supreme 
Judicial Court with two opportunities to address issues involving the 
impact of the National Labor Relations Act 1 (the Act) on state juris-
diction over conduct related to labor relations matters. In both instances 
the Court resolved the federal preemption issues in favor of state court 
jurisdiction over the actions. 
The first such case, Ezekiel v. ]ones Motor Co., Inc.,2 involved the 
question of whether or not there should be an absolute and unqualified 
privilege against slander actions for statements made during the course 
of a grievance procedure under a collective bargaining agreement.3 
The plaintiff, a former employee of the Jones Motor Company, had been 
discharged as a result of a police discovery that he was in unauthorized 
possession of property of the employer.4 Under the applicable collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the employee had the right to appeal his 
discharge to the New England Joint Area Committee, a union-manage-
ment grievance board.5 Ezekiel availed himself of that right.6 During 
the course of the hearing before this committee, another employee of 
Jones Motor Co. made an unsworn statement that he had observed 
Ezekiel steal a fishing rod and reel from the company.7 This statement 
formed the basis for the plaintiff's slander action against plaintiff's 
former employer and the employee who made the statement. 8 
At trial, the judge instmcted the jury that the defendant was entitled 
only to a conditional or qualified privilege.9 On the basis of this in-
32 Id. at 664 n.6, 373 N.E.2d at 1170 n.6. 
33 See text at notes 10-12 supra. 
§9.4. 1 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-169 ( 1976). 
2 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 333, 372 N.E.2d 1281. 
3 Id. at 335, 372 N.E.2d at 1284. The Court stated the difference between an 
absolute privilege, which the defendants sought, and a conditional privilege, which 
is what the Court held to be applicable: 
An absolute or unqualified privilege provides a complete defense to slander 
and libel suits, immunizing the defendant from all liability even if the de-
famatory statement is uttered maliciously or in bad faith. . . . With a quali-
fied or conditional privilege, a defendant is protected unless he abuses the 
privilege. 
Id. at 336, 372 N.E.2d at 1284. 
4 Id. at 334-35, 372 N.E.2d at 1283. 




9 ld. at 334 n.3, 372 N.E.2d at 1283 n.3. 
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struction, the jury found for the plaintiff against each of the defend-
ants.10 However, the trial judge entered judgments for the defendants 
notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the alleged slanderous 
statements were made in circumstances of an absolute and unqualified 
privilege.U On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court reversed with direc-
tions that the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff be reinstated.12 
The defendants argued, inter alia, that an absolute privilege should 
be extended to statements made in a grievance hearing in order to avoid 
frustrating the national labor policy of encouraging settlement of labor 
disputes through the peaceful collective bargaining process.13 The 
Court analogized the argument to a federal preemption claim and 
evaluated it under the principles set out in Farmer v. United Brother-
hood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25,14 which held that the National 
Labor Relations Act does not preempt a state court action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.15 Following the principles set out in 
Farmer, the Ezekiel Court balanced the potential interference with the 
scheme of the Act against the state's interest in protecting its citizens 
from tortious conduct.16 The Court, noting that protecting its citizens 
from slander has long been an interest of the state, held that a condi-
tional privilege provided sufficient protection against interference with 
the national labor policy in favor of resolving disputes through the 
grievance procedureP In further support of its holding, the Court 
cited Linn v. Plant Guard Workers,1 8 where the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Act does not preempt an action under state law for 
a. malicious libel published during a union organizational campaign.19 
The Court also rejected a non-preemption rationale for granting an 
absolute privilege. The defendants argued that since the grievance 
proceeding had many of the features of a judicial proceeding, the ab-
solute privilege against slander actions which statements made in judi-
cial proceedings enjoy should extend to grievance hearings under a 
collective bargaining agreement. 20 The Court disagreed with this con-
1o Id. at 333, 372 N.E.2d at 1283. 
11 Id. at 333-34, 372 N.E.2d at 1283. 
12 Id. at 346, 372 N.E.2d at 1288. 
1a Id. at 338, 372 N.E.2d at 1285. 
14 430 u.s. 290, 304-05 ( 1977). 
15 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 339-40, 372 N.E.2d at 1285-86. 
16 Id. at 340, 372 N.E.2d at 1286. 
17 Id. 
18 383 u.s. 53, 64-65 (1966). 
19 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 340, 372 N.E.2d at 1286. 
20 Id. at 337, 372 N.E.2d at 1284-85. The defendants were relying on Neece 
v. Kantu, 84 N.M. 700, 706, 507 P.2d 447, 453 ( 1973), where the Court of Appeals 
of New Mexico held the absolute privilege to be applicable to grievance proceed-
ings under a collective bargaining agreement because of its quasi-judicial nature. 
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tention, observing that while a witness in a judicial proceeding who 
might make defamatory statements is subject to the control of the judge 
and may be prosecuted for perjury or contempt, a witness in a private 
grievance proceeding "need not give sworn testimony, nor is he subject 
to the control of a judge to limit his testimony to competent, relevant, 
and material evidence." 21 
The second preemption case, Commonwealth v. Noffke,22 raised the 
question of whether the Act preempts application of the Massachusetts 
criminal trespass statute 2a to a non-employee union organizer dissemi-
nating information to employees on private property during an organ-
izational campaign. 24 Noffke was arrested and prosecuted for trespass 
when he refused to leave the parking lot of a private employer whose 
employees he was attempting to organize.25 After he was tried and 
convicted in the district court of violating chapter 266, section 120, the 
superior court ruled that the complaint should be dismissed on the 
ground that the trespass action was preempted by the Act.26 The su-
perior court stayed the order and reported the issue to the Appeals 
Court. After review by the Appeals Court,27 the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted an application for further appellate review.28 
The lower comts had dismissed the trespass action on the basis of 
the principles set forth in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon.29 There the United States Supreme Court held that conduct 
arguably protected or prohibited by sections 7 and 8 of the National 
Labor Relations Act is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.30 Subsequent to the' Appeals Court de-
cision in Noffke, however, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego District Council of Carpenters,31 
which the Supreme Judicial Court in Noffke characterized as "narrow-
[ing] the scope of preemption doctrine set out in the Garmon case." 32 
21 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 338, 372 N.E.2d at 1285. 
22 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2225, 379 N.E.2d at 1086. 
23 See G.L. c. 266, § 120. 
24 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2227, 379 N.E.2d at 1088. 
25 Id. at 2226, 379 N.E.2d at 1087. 
25 Id. at 2226-27, 379 N.E.2d at 1987-88. 
27 See Commonwealth v. Noffke, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 846, 364 N.E.2d 
127 4, affirming the decision of the superior court. 
28 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2227, 379 N.E.2d at 1088. 
29 359 u.s. 236, 244-45 ( 1959). 
30 Id. at 245. 
31 436 U.S. 180 (1978). See Casenote, State Court Jurisdiction Over Trespas-
sory Union Picketing: Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council 
of Carpenters, 20 B.C.L. REv. 558 (1979). 
32 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2228-29, 379 N.E.2d at 1088. 
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Using the guidelines set out in Sears, the Court reversed the dismissal 
of the trespass action against Noffke.33 
The Court explained that in Sears, the Supreme Court held that the 
arguably protected character of a union's trespassory conduct, such as 
was present in Noffke,34 did not preempt state court jurisdiction where: 
( 1) one party to the dispute could have presented it to the Board but 
did not; 35 ( 2) the other party had no acceptable means of bringing it 
before the Board; 36 and ( 3) there is not an unacceptable risk of inter-
ference with conduct that the Board would find to be protected. 37 
Applying this standard, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that 
the trespass prosecution was not preempted, although the defendant's 
conduct was arguably protected by section 7 of the Act.38 Under the 
Sears formula, the Court found that: ( 1) the defendant could have 
sa Id. at 2233, 2234, 379 N.E.2d at 1090. 
34 The picketing in Sears was both arguably protected by Section F [29 U.S.C. 
§ 157 ( 1976) 1 and by section 8 [29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) 1 of the National Labor 
Relations Act. See 436 U.S. at 190. The only question presented in Noffke, on 
the other hand, was whether the prosecution was preempted because the activity 
was arguably protected. See 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2230 n.6, 379 N.E.2d at 1089 
n.6. Therefore, the Noffke analysis proceeded under only one branch of the pre-
emption doctrine, namely whether the arguably protected character of the union 
organizer's trespass provided a sufficient justification for preemption of state court 
jurisdiction. 
The arguably prohibited branch of the preemption doctrine derives from the 
Supreme Court's determination that the congressional purpose in implementing the 
National Labor Relations Act evidenced a determination that single administration 
of specifically designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application be-
cause "[a] multiplicity of tribunals and diversity of procedures are quite as apt to 
produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substan-
tive law." Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 ( 1953). However, 
even under the arguably prohibited preemption doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
recognized an exception allowing state jurisdiction over conduct that touches "inter-
ests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of 
compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived 
the States of the power to act." San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236, 244 ( 1959). Analyzing this exception in Sears, the Supreme Court 
held that "[t]he critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the State is enforcing a 
law relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application but whether 
the controversy presented to the State Court is identical to . . . or different from 
. . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board." 
436 U.S. at 197. 
In Sears, the Court held that the trespass action was not preempted by the 
arguably prohibited nature of the union's conduct, because if that question had 
been presented to the Board, the issue would have been the union's purpose for 
the picketing whereas in the trespass action the only issue was the location of the 
picketing. 436 U.S. at 198. Therefore the Court held that the controversy was 
not the same as that which might have been presented to the Board. 
35 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2230, 379 N.E.2d at 1089. 
so Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 2231, 379 N.E.2d at 1089. 
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presented the dispute to the Board but did not do so; 39 ( 2) the em-
ployer had no acceptable means of bringing the case to the Board since 
organizational solicitation on an employer's property by nonemployers 
is not within the proscriptions of the Act; 40 and ( 3) there was not an 
"unacceptable" risk that the assertion of jurisdiction would interfere 
with conduct which the Board would find protected.41 The Court there-
fore concluded: 
The assumption by a State court of jurisdiction over the conduct 
of the defendant here, which is within the category of trespassory 
activity referred to in Sears, does not, therefore, create a risk of 
interference with federally protected activity which is sufficiently 
high to justify preempting the only alternative for peaceful resolu-
tion of the dispute. 42 
Despite the Court's easy application of the formula articulated in 
Sears, it is questionable whether the result in Noffke should have been 
so automatic. First, the Noffke trespass is not within the category of 
trespassory activity referred to in Sears; Sears involved trespassory-area-
standards picketing 43 while the activity in Noffke was campaigning 
leading up to an NLRB election.44 The Supreme Court had noted in 
Sears that "several factors make the argument for protection of tres-
passory-area-standards picketing as a category of conduct less com-
pelling than that for trespassory organizational solicitation." 45 Second, 
the Sears decision also revolved around the union's "fair opportunity" 
to present the matter before the National Labor Relations Board.46 
As in Sears, the union in Noffke could have presented the matter to the 
Board, but because an election was pending, different considerations 
apply in assessing the "fairness" of that opportunity. The matter could 
have been presented to the Board either in the form of objections to 
39 Id. There was some evidence that a charge had been filed by the defendant 
with the NLRB and that the Regional Director had refused to issue a complaint. 
Id. at 2231 n.7, 379 N.E.2d at 1089 n.7. However, the Court did not consider this 
evidence because it was not a matter of record before the Court. Id. See text and 
notes at 45-46 infra. 
40 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2231-32, 379 N.E.2d at 1089. 
41 Id. at 2232, 379 N.E.2d at 1089. In support of this finding, the Supreme 
Judicial Court cited National Labor Relations Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 
U.S. 105, 112 (1956) which states the general rule that an employer may prohibit 
nonemployees from union solicitation on his property. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2232, 
379 N.E.2d at 1089-90. 
42 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2233, 379 N.E.2d at 1090. 
43 436 U.S. at 185-87. 
44 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2225-26, 379 N.E.2d at 1087. A petition for an 
election had been filed with the Board and an election had been directed. Id. at 
2226, 379 N.E.2d at 1087. 
45 436 U.S. at 206 n.42. 
46 Id. at 207. 
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the election results if the union lost the election, or in the form of an 
unfair labor practice cbarge. If charges were filed before the election, 
the union could have requested either that the election be suspended 
pending the resolution of the charges or that the election proceed 
without prejudi~ing the union's right to file subsequent objections. The 
major distinction between that situation and Sears is that if it is sub-
sequently determined that the union should have been allowed access, 
the employees' organizational rights have been impinged, and their 
opportunity for a fully informed choice on the question of union 
representation has been delayed. Thus, while the union has an op-
portunity to present the question to the Board, the "fairness" of that 
opportunity, from the point of view of the employees, is questionable. 
Assuming that Sears was properly decided, the Supreme Judicial Court 
should have more carefully examined the applicability and effect of 
Sears to the facts involved in Noffke. 
§9.5. Grievance Arbitration in Public Sector Disputes. The vast ma-
jority of collective bargaining agreements contain procedures for the 
resolution of disputes over the interpretation and application of their 
provisions. Most such procedures provide for an ultimate determination 
by a neutral arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. The resolution of dis-
putes in this manner is a cornerstone of the national labor relations 
policy,1 as well as the Massachusetts labor relations policy.2 Section 
8 of chapter 150E of the General Laws specifically authorizes the in-
clusion of such a provision in public sector collective bargaining agree-
ments and also authorizes the Labor Relations Commission to order 
binding arbitration of disputes concerning the application or interpre-
tation of the agreement in the absence of such a provision. 
Most arbitration cases are resolved without recourse to judicial pro-
ceedings. Moreover, the authority of the courts to overturn arbitration 
awards is substantially restricted by the limited grounds set forth in 
section 11 of chapter 150C. Certain troublesome judicial issues are 
raised, however, by arbitration in the public sector, particularly by the 
potential conflict between arbitration awards and the statutory rights 
and duties of public bodies to manage their operations.3 In recent 
years the Supreme Judicial Court has frequently confronted issues 
§9.5. l See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 
363 u.s. 574,577-78 (1960). 
2 See Marceau v. Gould National Batteries, Inc., 344 Mass. 120, 124, 181 
N.E.2d 664, 667 ( 1962). 
3 See generally Grunebaum, Litton & Dolan, Labor Law, 1977 ANN. Sunv. 
MAss. LAw §16.5 [hereinafter cited as Labor Law]; Student Comment, The Scope 
of Grievance Arbitration in Public Employment: School Committee of Danvers v. 
Tyman ( aml two companion cases) (Trilogy), 1977 ANN. SuRv. MASs. LAw §16.6 
[hereinafter cited as Scope of Grievance Arbitration]. 
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involving grievance arbitration in the public sector,4 and it did so again 
this Survey year in the context of three decisions. 
School Committee of Southbridge v. Brown 5 involved an arbitration 
over a school committee's denial of a request for sabbatical leave. The 
applicable collective bargaining agreement contained a provision that 
"sabbatical leave may be granted to members of the Southbridge 
Teachers Association by the Superintendent of Schools for approved 
scholarly programs." G When Brown's request for a sabbatical leave 
was denied, he pursued the matter under the grievance procedures set 
forth in the agreement, and ultimately demanded arbitration on the 
issue. 7 The School Committee responded by commencing an action 
under chapter 150C, section 2( b) ( 2), to stay the arbitration proceed-
ing.H When an order granting the stay was issued, the grievant ap-
pealed and was granted direct appellate review.0 The Supreme Judicial 
Court reversed.10 
The agreement defined a grievance as "any alleged violation, mis-
interpretation or inequitable or unfair application of the provisions of 
this agreement." 11 The Court accepted the proposition that while it 
could not decide the merits of an arbitrable matter, it could properly 
determine whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate a particular 
dispute.12 The Court then held that the dispute was not arbitrable, 
4 See School Committee of Danvers v. Tyrnan, 372 Mass. 106, 360 N.E.2d 877 
( 1977); Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School Committee v. Dennis Teachers Ass'n, 
372 Mass. 116, 360 N.E.2d 883 ( 1977); School Committee of West Bridgewater 
v. West Bridgewater Teachers' Ass'n, 372 Mass. 121, 360 N.E.2d 886 ( 1977) (all 
discussed in Labor Law and Scope of Grievance Arbitration, supra note 3]; School 
Committee of Hanover v. Curry, 369 ~lass. 683, 343 N.E.2d 144 (1976); School 
Committee of Braintree v. Raymond, 369 Mass. 686, 343 N.E.2d 145 ( 1976). 
5 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1688, 377 N.E.2d 935. 
6 Id. at 1689, 377 N.E.2d at 936. 
7 Id. at 1690, 377 N.E.2d at 936. 
8 Id. This subsection states: 
Upon application, the superior court may stay an arbitration proceeding 
commenced or threatened if it finds . . . ( 2) that the claim sought to be 
arbitrated does not state a controversy covered by the provision for arbi-
tration and disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 
arbitration provision are not themselves made subject to arbitration. 
The collective bargaining agreement contained no provision for arbitration of dis-
putes concerning the interpretation or application of the arbitration provision. Id. 
at 1690 n.2, 377 N.E.2d at 936 n.2. 
u Id. at 1688, 377 N.E.2d at 935. 
10 Id. at 1694, 377 N.E.2d at 938. 
11 Id. at 1689, 377 N.E.2d at 936. 
12 Id. at 1691, 377 N.E.2d at 936-37. The Court specifically declined to con-
sider whether there should be a presumption of atbitrability or of nonarbitrability in 
public school disputes, noting that the New York Court of Appeals, in Super-
intendent of Schools of Liverpool Central School District v. United Liverpool 
Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 369 N.E.2d 1746, 399 N.Y.S.2d 180 ( 1977), re-
21
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either as an alleged violation or as a misinterpretation of the provisions 
of the agreement, because the agreement itself, consistent with a 
statute, 1 ~ committed the grant or denial of sabbatical leaves to the 
discretion of the School Committee.14 In support of this holding, the 
Court reasoned that "in the absence of explicit contrary language, 
discretionary decisions are not 'violations' subject to arbitration under 
the collective bargaining agreement involved here" 15 and that "the 
parties [did not] intend that a discretionary decision concerning a 
sabbatical leave might be a 'misinterpretation' of the agreement." 16 
However, the Court refused to stay the arbitration on the ground 
that the grievance, although it did not so allege by its terms, might 
involve an "inequitable or unfair application" of the provisions.17 The 
Court held that allowing an arbitrator to determine whether Brown's 
application was "apprised in good faith and on equal terms with all 
others" would not unduly interfere with the Committee's prerogative.18 
It expressly left open the question of whether or not decisions to grant 
sabbatical leaves are a matter which a school committee may not agree, 
in advance, to delegate to an arbitrator for decision, and what type of 
relief, if any, would be appropriate in an instance where the arbitrator 
determines that a school committee has acted unfairly.19 
The other two grievance arbitration cases decided by the Supreme 
Judicial Court involved the authority of arbitrators to order school 
committees to place employees in particular positions. The first case, 
Bradley v. School Committee of Boston,20 involved sixteen principals 
in the Boston school system whose requests for transfers had been 
denied.21 An arbitrator held that these denials violated the agreement 
and ordered the Committee to approve all sixteen transfers.22 The 
arbitrator found that the Committee had not rejected the transfers 
because the principals were unqualified, but rather had denied their 
requests in order to fill vacancies in accordance with procedures in-
volving community participation.23 
jected a presumption of arbitrability, requiring instead a "clear, unequivocal agree-
ment" to arbitrate. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1691 & n.3, 377 N.E.2d at 937 & n.3. 
13 See G.L. c. 71, § 41A, which gives school committees discretion to grant 
leaves of absence for study. 
14 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1692-93, 377 N.E.2d at 937. 
15 Id. at 1692, 377 N.E.2d at 937. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1693, 377 N.E.2d at 937. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 1693-94, 377 N.E.2d at 937-38. 
2o 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1514, 364 N.E.2d 1229. 
21 Id. at 1515, 364 N.E.2d at 1230. 
22 Id. at 1515-17, 364 N.E.2d at 1231. 
23 Id. at 1516-17, 364 N.E.2d at 1231. The collective bargaining agreement 
provided that vacant principal positions were to be filled through a promotional 
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The School Committee sought to vacate the award on two grounds: 
first, that the question of interschool transfers of incumbent personnel 
was a matter within the exclusive managerial prerogative of the Com-
mittee; 24 and second, that even if an arbitrator had authority to consider 
the principals' transfer rights, he had no remedial authority to order the 
approval of the transfers.25 The Supreme Judicial Court rejected both 
arguments.26 
The Court noted that the case did not present the question of a 
school committee's right to appoint appropriate principals, but rather 
was limited to the question of the manner of filling positions, there 
being no question that the principals were qualified for the positions 
they sought. 27 The Court found that the manner of filling vacant 
school principalships involved both conditions of employment and issues 
affecting educational policy. It therefore sought to determine "whether 
the issues of educational policy which are implicated in the criteria for 
filling vacant principalships so outweigh the similarly implicated issues 
of employment conditions that the committee cannot make even 
voluntary agreements on this subject." 28 
Applying this test, the Court found that the balance weighed on the 
side of the principals: the decisions involved were not exclusively 
managerial because the agreement did not eliminate the Committee's 
right to disapprove transfer requests, it did not prevent the Committee 
from deciding that a particular school required a principal selected 
through procedures involving community participation, it did not require 
the Committee to approve transfer requests of qualified incumbents 
·after the agreement's expiration, and it did not conflict with any 
"established committee educational policies." 29 The Court also held 
that the order to approve the transfers did not impinge on the Com-
mittee's exclusive managerial prerogatives nor by-pass the required 
approval procedures since the Committee had never questioned the 
suitability of the principals for the positions they sought.30 On that 
basis the Court characterized the action as one where the Committee 
had found the applicants to be qualified and appropriate to fill the 
rating system involving community participation, except if the positions were filled 
through transfers of competent incumbents. Id. Thus, the arbitrator characterized 
the parties' dispute as concerning the criteria for transfer disapproval and not the 
committee's established contractual right to disapprove incumbent transfers on 
their merits. Id. at 1517 n.4, 364 N.E.2d at 1231 n.4. 
24 Id. at 1517, 364 N.E.2d at 1231-32. 
25 Id., 364 N.E.2d at 1232. 
26 Id. at 1518, 364 N.E.2d at 1232. 
27 Id. at 1518-19, 364 N.E.2d at 1232. 
28 Id. at 1519-20, 364 N.E.2d at 1232-33. 
29 Id. at 1520-21, 364 N.E.2d at 1233. 
so Id. at 1523, 364 N.E.2d at 1234, 
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vacancies. 31 In these circumstances, the Court held, the arbitrator 
had not exceeded his authority by ordering the transfers because the 
Committee had voluntarily agreed to approve transfers of qualified 
incumbent principals.32 
In the third case involving grievance arbitration, School Committee 
of West Springfield v. Korbut,33 the Court upheld an arbitration award 
ordering a teacher reinstated to his position as coordinator of language 
arts for one school year.34 Korbut had held this department chairman-
ship for two school years, but was not reappointed for the third year.35 
An arbitrator found that the collective bargaining agreement required 
that a department chairman whose nonreappointment resulted from a 
predominantly disciplinary motive be given written notice of the decision 
and an opportunity to be heard.36 Since Korbut had not been accorded 
these procedures, the arbitrator ordered back pay and reinstatement.37 
Only the issue of Korbut's reinstatement, and not the issue of hack 
pay 3 R was before the superior and appellate courts. Accordingly, the 
scope of review before the Supreme Judicial Court was similarly 
limited.39 
The School Committee argued that the award was deficient both 
because it exceeded the scope of reference and because the order of 
reinstatement was in excess of the arbitrator's authority.40 The Court 
rejected both arguments. 
With regard to the first argument, the Committee claimed that the 
arbitrator "changed" the issue from whether the agreement was vio-
lated to a question of whether the nonreappointment was for disci-
plinary purposes.41 The Court agreed that arbitrators are required to 
act within the scope of the reference to them, but found that considera-
tion of the motive for the nonreappointment was "secondary to and not 
a separate issue from" the question of whether the procedures required 
by the agreement had been foll6wed. 42 The Court noted that the Com-
mittee's argument constituted an objection that the arbitrator had 
committed an error of law in interpreting and applying the agreement.43 
31 Id. 
32 Id. See note 23 supra. 
33 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2548, 369 N.E.2d 1148. 
34 Id. at 2548-49, 369 N.E.2d at 1149-50. 
35 Id. at 2549-50, 369 N.E.2d at 1150. 
36 Id. at 2550-51, 369 N.E.2d at 1150. 
37 Id. . 
38 Id. at 2551, 369 N.E.2d at 1150. 
39 Id. 
4o Id. 
41 Id. at 2552, 369 N.E.2d at 1151. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 2552-53, 369 N.E.2d at 1151. 24
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In response to this implied challenge, the Court stated the settled 
rule that a comt may not vacate or modify an arbitration award 
resting on error of law or fact, absent fraud.44 
With respect to the question of the arbitrator's authority to order 
Korbut's reinstatement, the Committee argued that the award violated 
chapter 71, sections 37 and 38, by requiring the Committee to surrender 
its discretion on matters of educational policy.45 The Court held, 
however, that what was involved was not an area of the Committee's 
exclusive prerogative,4 G distinguishing the facts in Korbut from those 
present in School C01nmittee of Hanover v. Curry 47 and School Com-
mittee of Braintree v. Raymond.48 Those cases held that school com-
mittees possess a nondelegable right to abolish supervisory positions.49 
The Court also pointed to a number of other cases holding that the 
authority of school committees to appoint and reappoint academic 
personnel is nondelegable.50 However, the Court distinguished these 
cases on the ground that Korbut involved only the procedures to be 
followed for the reappointment or nonreappointment of the individual, 
not the Committee's right to refuse Korbut's reappointment. 51 The 
Court analogized this issue to earlier cases, such as School Committee 
of Danvers v. Tyman,52 in which it held that arbitrators may order 
reinstatement of non-tenured personnel if a school committee has failed 
to follow agreed-upon evaluation procedures.53 Finally, the Court 
pointed out that the. award would not give Korbut tenure in the position 
and that his continued service beyond one year was discretionary with 
the Committee assuming all procedural requirements were met.54 
Korbut is noteworthy in its failure to address the issue of "harmless 
error." In Tyman the Court noted that not all violations of teachers' 
H Id. at 2553, 369 N.E.2d at 1151. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 2553-55, 369 N.E.2d at 1151-52. 
47 369 Mass. 683, 343 N.E.2d 144 (1976). 
48 369 Mass. 686, 343 N.E.2d 145 ( 1976). 
4U 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2555, 369 N.E.2d at 1152. 
5o See id. at 2555-56, 369 N.E.2d at 1152-53 for cases cited. 
51 Id. at 2557, 369 N.E.2d at 1153. 
52 372 Mass. 106, 114-15, 360 N.E.2d 877, 882 ( 1977). 
53 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2557, 369 N.E.2d at 1153. The Tyman court stated: 
Once a school committee agrees to follow certain procedures and to permit 
binding arbitration concerning its alleged failure to adhere to those practices, 
we see no public policy considerations which prevent full implementation 
of the terms of the agreement, subject, however, to the retention in favor 
of the school committee of its nondelegable rights. Indeed, adherence to 
the evaluation procedures may be expected to provide information to the 
school committee which will permit it to make a fairer and more informed 
judgment concerning a teacher. 
372 Mass. at 114-15, 360 N.E.2d at 882. 
54 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2559, 369 N.E.2d at 1154. 
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rights justify reinstatement 55 and stated, "[ w ]e leave open the question 
of the validity of an award which imposes sanctions because of the 
failure of a school committee to follow evaluation procedures although 
no teacher was harmed by the omission." 56 In this case, the question 
of whether Korbut had been harmed by the violation of his procedural 
rights would have been simple to determine. Whether Korbut was 
harmed by the Committee's failure to provide him with notice and a 
hearing was dependent upon whether he would have been reappointed 
had the procedural requirements been met. This could have been 
resolved by remanding the case for hearing required by the agreement. 
This situation is distinguishable from the evaluation procedures cases 57 
inasmuch as the purpose of evaluations is to give the teacher an op-
portunity to improve his or her performance.58 Here, however, there is 
nothing that Korbut could have done to change his performance even if 
he had been afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard. Thus 
his rights could have been fully protected if the matter had been re-
manded to provide him those rights. The fact that the Court went 
beyond this and ordered his reinstatement appears to indicate that it 
is prepared to accept sanctions against a violation of procedures even 
without a demonstration that harm has occurred. If that is the result 
of the case it seems inconsistent with the balancing principles applied 
in Bradley v. School Committee of Boston.59 
§9.6. Interest Arbitration: Effect of Judicial Modification of an Award: 
Severability. In Marlboro Firefighters, Local 1714, IAFF, AFL-CIO v. 
City of Marlboro, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court considered the authority 
of the courts to enforce a final and binding award of an arbitration 
panel where the court has set aside a portion of the award as illegal.2 
One of the items in the union's proposal submitted to the panel was a 
"minimum manning" provision dealing with the number of firefighters 
on duty during each shift.3 The City had taken the position that this 
55 372 Mass. at 114, 360 N.E.2d at 882, citing Mt. Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 ( 1977). 
56 372 Mass. at 114, 360 N.E.2d at 882. 
57 See Tyman; Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School Committee v. Dennis Teachers 
Ass'n, 372 Mass. 116, 360 N.E.2d 883 (1977); School Committee of West Bridge-
water v. West Bridgewater Teachers' Ass'n, 372 Mass. 121, 360 N.E.2d 886 ( 1977). 
58 See School Committee of West Bridgewater, 372 Mass. at 124-25, 360 N.E.'2d 
at 888. 
59 See text at notes 20-32 supra. 
§9.6. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1820, 378 N.E.2d 437. 
2 The award at issue was a "last and best offer" arbitration made by an 
arbitration panel formed pursuant to a statutory procedure applicable to firefighters 
and police officers. See Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 4 before amendment by Acts of 
1977, c. 347, § 2. 
3 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1822, 378 N.E.2d 438-39. 
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issue was a matter of managerial prerogative about which it was not 
obliged to bargain, and it put forth its own offer.4 e union countered 
with the contention that the issue was sufficiently re ated to safety and 
working conditions to be a mandatory subject of col ective bargaining.11 
The panel, authorized to select one of the two offers ut not to propose 
an alternative solution of its own,6 selected the u ion's offer, which 
included the "minimum manning" provision. 7 Th only other item 
that had truly been at issue was the subject of the fi efighter's salaries.8 
Dissatisfied with the panel's selection, the City br ught an action in 
superior court.9 Upon agreement of the parties, th s action was con-
solidated with the union's subsequent enforceme t action.10 The 
superior court held that the award was partially i valid in that the 
manning provision lay outside the scope of mandata y bargaining, and 
thus was beyond the panel's jurisdiction.11 The Cit then argued that 
the entire award must be denied enforcement bee use of its partial 
invalidity, and therefore, inasmuch as the union's offer was not en-
forceable it followed that the City's offer must b accepted as the 
award.12 The union took the position that severance was reasonable 
and appropriate here, and it further argued that in II cases of partial 
invalidity the party whose offer has been selected sh uld have the right 
to decide whether to accept severance of the invalid portion or to seek 
vacation of the entire awardP The superior cour , concluding that 
the separation of the invalid portion of the award cou d be done without 
doing an injustice, entered an order enforcing the rtion of the award 
that it considered valid.14 
When the case reached the Supreme Judicial Cour only the question 
of the effect of the partial invalidity of the award w s in issue because 
the case proceeded on the assumption that the man ing item had been 
improperly included in the offer and the award.15 Th Supreme Judicial 
Comt affirmed the judgment enforcing the valid porti ns of the award.16 
The Court noted that courts have frequently seve ed portions of an 
4 Id., 378 N.E.2d at 439. 
o Id. at 1822-23, 378 N.E.2d at 439. 
6 Id. at 1821, 378 N.E.2d at 438. 
7 Id. at 1821, 1823, 378 N.E.2d at 438, 439. 
s Id. at 1826, 378 N.E.2d at 440. 
9 Id. at 1821-22, 378 N.E.2d at 438. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1823, 378 N.E.2d at 439. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 1823-24, 378 N.E.2d at 439. 
15 Id. at 1823, 1824, 378 N.E.2d at 439. 
16 Id. at 1824, 378 N.E.2d at 439. 
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arbitrator's award which exceeded the arbitrator's power and enforced 
the remainder,17 citing, as an example, its recent decision in School 
Committee of Braintree v. Raymond.18 The Court, quoting McCormick 
v. Gray,19 stated the proper standard for severance to be that the lawful 
portion of the award should not appear to be affected by the court's 
alteration of the arbitrator's award.20 One instance where the entire 
award ought to be vacated is when a "functional relationship" between 
the legal and illegal portions of the award would cause enforcement 
of the legal portion to lead to "an untoward and unworkable result." 21 
Another instance mentioned by the Court is "where it can be seen that 
the arbitrator's decision as to the legal part was influenced by his 
... disposition of the part later found to be illegal." 22 It then proceeded 
to· <tnalyze the award to determine whether in this case the legal portion 
was sufficiently independent of the illegal portion to stand alone. 
The Court concluded that neither problem was present in this award. 
Seeing "no practical difficulty or awkwardness" in administering the 
remainder of the contract without the "minimum manning" provision,23 
it turned to the inquiry of whether "the panel's judgment regarding the 
manning provision was so far related to its judgment on the other items, 
that the latter judgment would not have been reached if manning had 
been absent from the union's offer as it was from the City's." 24 The 
Court experienced no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the 
panel would not have acted differently, stressing that the salary portion 
of the award had a solid justification independent of the justification 
for the union's tendered manning offer, and vice versa.25 Finally the 
Comt rejected as "speculative and unreal" 26 the City's argument that, 
in the absence of the manning proposal, the parties would have advanced 
different last offers; it remarked that the City's actual offer was pred-
17 Id. 
18 369 Mass. 686, 343 N.E.2d 145 (1976). 
19 54 U.S. (13 How.) 26, 39 (1851 ). 




24 Id. at 1825-26, 378 N.E.2d at 440. 
25 The Court stated: 
To put the matter in a different way, it seems clear that the panel would 
have chosen the union's offer even if manning had not been included; in-
deed there is no serious contention to the contrary. We may say that as the 
manning provisions represented advantages to the union, their omission 
would have produced a more modest offer perhaps more acceptable to the 
panel than the one in fact submitted. 
Id. at 1827, 378 N.E.2d at 441. 
26 Id. 
28
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icated upon no change in the existing manning.~; Moreover, it as-
sumed that the union would not have changed the o~her aspects of its 
offer if the maPning proposal had not been raised.28 
Both the Supreme Judicial Court and the superior cburt acted soundly 
in reaching the conclusion that partial invalidity had no effect in this 
case. The courts were readily able to determine th*t the salary issue 
was quite unrelated to the manning issue. Thus the changed award 
worked no unfairness on the parties. On the questibn of whether the 
arbitration panel would have acted differently, the courts were aided 
by the panel's written opinion explaining its reason~ for the award.29 
But where an arbitrator is not required to write such an opinion, it 
will be more difficult for the reviewing court not Ito undermine the 
arbitration process by substituting its own judgment when it is called 
on to determine whether the arbitrator would have ~ade the particular 
award that he did, had he known part of the award would later be 
invalidated. I 
§9.7. Open Meeting Law. Chapter .39, sections 2~A-24, of the Gen-
eral Laws constitutes the open meeting law as it applies to municipal 
bodies. 1 That la\v provides, with certain enumeratEjd exceptions, that 
meetings of gowrnmental hoclies must be open to thlc public. One ex-
ception is where the law is inconsistent with other laws; ~ another is for 
conducting collectiv(' bargaining sessions.:l During thle Survey year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court considered both these 1xceptions in two 
separate decisions. 1 
27 Id. 
~s Id. The Court's assumption that the deletion of the manning provision would 
not have affected the other aspects of the union's offer is cdntrary to the realities 
of collective bargaining. The union's final offer, at least irt theory, should have 
been based on an estimation of what the City could afford ~o pay for the overall 
settlement. If it had not included the manning provision, ~he union would have 
been reasonable in increasing its other demands. But whether or not that would 
have affected the union's decision is, at best, speculative. I . 
~!l See id. at 1822 n.3, 378 N.E.2d at 438 n.3. While the panel was not at that 
time required to write an opinion, the statute has since been amended to require 
written opinions. See note 2 supra. 1 
§9.7. 1 The open meeting law applicable to state and County bodies can be 
found in G.L. c. 30A, §§ llA and llAJ; and G.L. c. 34, §§ ,9F and 9G. 
~ G.L. e. 39, § 24 states in relevant part: "The provisioqs of this chapter shall 
be in force only so far as they arc not inconsistent with the express provisions of 
any general or special law .... " 1 
:1 G.L. c. 39, § 23B states in relevant part: "Executive sessions may be held 
only for the following purposes: . . . ( 3) To discuss strategy with respect to 
colk>Ctive bargaining or litigation if an open meeting may have a detrimental 
eflect on the bargaining or litigating position of the governmental body, and to 
conduct collective bargaining sessions. . .. " Section 23A stptes that an executive 
session is "any meeting of a governmental body which is -closed to certain persons 
for deliberation on certain matters." 
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The "inconsistency" exception was considered in Attorney General v. 
School Committee of Northampton,4 where the Court determined that 
the School Committee had violated the open meeting law by failing 
to disclose the names of candidates for the position of Superintendent 
of Schools.5 A screening committee had submitted a list of sixteen 
candidates to the School Committee, which considered the list in public 
session. The discussion at the public meeting, however, referred to the 
candidates by number without identifying them by name.6 A local 
reporter's request for a list of the candidates' names was denied by the 
Committee.7 The Attorney General subsequently brought an action 
seeking a declaration that the list of the sixteen candidates was a public 
record under chapter 4, section 7, and that the Committee's refusal to 
disclose the names at the meeting was a violation of the open meeting 
law.8 
The superior court, in a memorandum decision held that the Com-
mittee's refusal to disclose the names at the meeting did violate section 
23B of chapter 39.n It ordered disclosure via amendment of the minutes 
of the meeting, but not before ( 1) the undisclosed applicants had 
consented to disclosure of their names, and ( 2) the court had de-
termined in camera whether the privacy interests of non-consenting 
applicants warranted continued non-disclosure.10 The School Com-
mittee appealed but the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment 
of the superior court, giving its approval to the procedure adopted by 
that court.11 
With respect to the open meeting law, the Committee argued that 
its concern for the candidates' anonymity 12 was in accordance with the 
"inconsistency" provision of section 24,1 3 through the state right of 
privacy law, which protects a person against "unreasonable, substantial, 
or serious interference with his privacy." 14 The Court stated that if a 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1108, 375 N.E.2d 1188. The case is also discussed in 
Delaney, State and Local Government, supra § 2.8 at 53-55. 
5 !d. at 1110-11, 375 N.E.2d at ll90. 
6 !d. at 1108-09, 375 N.E.2d at 1189. 
7 !d. at 1109, 375 N.E.2d at 1189. 
8 !d. 
9 Id. 
10 !d. at ll10, 375 N.E.2d at ll90. 
11 !d. at 1ll5, 375 N.E.2d at 1191-92. 
12 The superior court had found that disclosure of some applicants' names could 
adversely affect their attempts to obtain future employment, ability to function in 
their present positions, or their standing in their communities. Id. at 1115 n.5, 
379 N.E.2d at ll91 n.5. 
13 See note 2 supra. 
14 G.L. c. 214, § 1B provides in full: "A person shall have a right against un-
reasonable, substantial, or serious interference with his privacy. The superior 
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showing of this statutory right to privacy had been made with regard 
to a particular candidate, then the open meeting law wtuld have had to 
give away.15 Since the Committee had failed to sh w that the dis-
closure of any candidate's name would constitute n unreasonable, 
substantial, or serious interference with his privacy, the Committee's 
reliance on chapter 214, section 1B, was misplaced.H1 
The Court then turned to the issues of whether the ~ist of names was 
a public record and whether the judge had acted properly in deciding 
to make in camera reviews of particular candidates' requests for privacy. 
Although noting that the Attorney General had not appealed and that 
it thus "need not consider whether more complete d;'sclosure was re-
quired than may result under the terms of the judgm nt," 17 the Court 
chose to rule on the Committee's "premature" claim t at there was an 
absolute bar to disclosure of the names as a matter of public record.18 
The Committee argued that the list was not a public record because 
the applicants' privacy interests were recognized ad protected by 
statutes.19 The Committee again pointed specifically to chapter 214, 
section 1B, as well as to chapter 4, section 7, twenty-six h.20 The Court, 
determining that chapter 4, section 7, recognizes a privacy interest on a 
standard more favorable to non-disclosure than does chapter 214, section 
1B, considered only the impact of section 7.21 It de~rmined that the 
superior court correctly applied section 7 when, findi g that disclosure 
might amount to an invasion of some applicants' p 'vacy, the court 
adopted an applicant-by-applicant approach to the privacy question.22 
The fact that some names ought not be revealed did not entitle the 
committee to suppression of all names. The superiol court's decision 
was viewed by the Court as "wholly consistent with tre basic purpose 
of the public record law which presumes in favor I of disclosure." 23 
court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce such 
therewith to award damages." 
15 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1112, 375 N.E.2d at 1190. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1113, 375 N.E.2d at 1191. 
right and in connection 
I 
18 Id. The Court termed the Committee's claim to an absolute bar against dis-
closure premature because no judgment had been entered by then directing 
disclosure of the name of any applicant whose privacy would be infringed. 
1o Id. at 1113-14, 375 N.E.2d at 1191. I 
20 Id. at 1114, 375 N.E.2d at 1191. G.L. c. 4, § 7, twenty~sixth excludes, inter 
alia, the following from the definition of public records: mate1ial and data which 
are " (a) specifically or by necessary implication exempted from disclosure by 
statute; . . . (c) personnel and medical files or information; also any other materials 
or data relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of which may 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 
21 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1114-15, 375 N.E.2d at 1191. 
22 Id. at 1115, 375 N.E.2d at 1191-92. 
23 Id., 375 N.E.2d at 1192. 
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Finding no contrary statutory policy of non-disclosure, the Court thus 
affirmed the decision of the superior court.24 
The second case, Ghiglione v. School Committee of Southbridge,2ts 
involved the "collective bargaining sessions" exception to the open 
meeting law.26 The question in Ghiglione was whether this exception 
extended to grievance proceedings under an existing collective bargain-
ing agreement. At the conclusion of a regularly scheduled meeting of 
the Southbridge School Committee, the chairperson announced that 
it would consider a teacher's grievance stemming from denial of a 
requested sabbatical leave.27 The hearing was closed to the public 
according to the teacher's request and the applicable collective bargain-
ing agreement, and a citizen was forcibly removed from the room.28 
Three voters commenced an action in superior court charging a 
violation of chapter 39, section 23B, and seeking disclosure of the minutes 
of the hearing. 20 The superior court ruled that the grievance hearing 
was not subject to the open meeting law, the plaintiffs appealed, and 
the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.30 
Even assuming that the hearing was a "meeting," the Court held 
that it came squarely within the "collective bargaining session" ex-
ception. 31 "Collective bargaining sessions" include not just the negotia-
tions leading up to an agreement, but grievance resolution pursuant to 
the agreement as well.32 In support of this reasoning, the Court quoted 
a statement by the United States Supreme Court that "[t]he grievance 
procedure is, in other words, a part of the continuous collective bargain-
ing process." 33 
24 Id. 
25 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2150, 378 N.E.2d 984. 
20 See note 3 supra. 
27 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2150-51, 378 N.E.2d at 986. Questions relating to 
the arbitration of this grievance were considered in School Committee of South-
bridge v. Brown, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1688, 377 N.E.2d 935. The Brown de-
cision is discussed in § 9.5 supra at 194-95. 
28 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2151, 378 N.E.2d at 986. 
2!1 Id. at 2150, 2151, 378 N.E.2d at 985, 986. 
ao Id. at 2152, 378 N.E.2d at 986. 
31 I d. at 2153-54, 378 N .E.2d at 987. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 2154, 378 N.E.2d at 987, quoting United Steelworkers of America v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960). 
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